We examine the force of the reciprocity norm in gift giving experiments in which mutual gift giving is ecient but gifts are individually costly. Our main result is that we ®nd almost no evidence for reciprocity. Gifts supplied are unrelated to gifts received. This applies equally to the Poverty Game (player 1 gives to player 2, player 2 gives to player 1) and the Pension Game (player 2 gives to player 1, player 3 gives to player 2, player 4 gives to player 3, etc.). Nevertheless, we do ®nd substantial levels of gift giving. Furthermore, these levels are higher in the Pension Game than in the Poverty Game. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Experimental inquiry has produced a substantial body of evidence indicating that strategic decision-making is often at odds with the presumptions of strict gamesmanship. For instance, several experimental studies have shown a substantial degree of cooperation among players in social dilemmas. Both among economists and psychologists, these results have sparked a serious interest, both theoretically and experimentally, in the strength and consequences of ethical values and social norms. In spite of this acknowledged importance, social norms have rarely been the direct focus of research (see, e.g., Kerr, 1995) . In this paper we examine more closely the norm of reciprocity. An important and well-recognized feature of reciprocity is that it sometimes allows a more ecient outcome to be achieved in situations with partially con¯icting interests. Therefore, reciprocity has been called a``natural law'' (Sugden, 1986) and one of the``cements of society'' (Elster, 1989) . If there is trust that a cooperative choice will be reciprocated, there is room for mutually bene®cial cooperation.
A problem which sets itself at the outset is that reciprocity means dierent things to dierent authors (Kerr, 1995) . Furthermore, some use other labels ± like fairness, or interpersonal orientation ± for concepts which are very close to what most scholars now call reciprocity. Most authors seem to agree that reciprocity refers to a conditional obligation, not an unconditional one, such as, for instance, under (pure or impure) altruism. Reciprocity refers to a quid pro quo; good behavior is rewarded and bad behavior is punished. In addition, most authors take it that reciprocity considerations apply in response to observed behavior of others. As Gouldner (Gouldner, 1960, p. 171) puts it:`w e owe others certain things because of what they have previously done for us''. Some authors, however, take a somewhat broader perspective and allow reciprocity considerations to be applied in situations where the behavior of others is (yet) unknown (e.g., Rabin, 1993) . In these cases people reciprocate the anticipated behavior of others.
In the present paper we will concentrate on the ®rst version of reciprocity which relates to responses to observed choices of others. Reciprocity is then only possible if two conditions are met. First, there must be sequentiality in the move structure: one player acts, a second player reacts. Second, the reacting player must be informed about the action of the ®rst player. Budescu et al. (1995) refer to these two conditions as``priority in time'' and``priority in information'', respectively. If the player moving second does not know how the ®rst player acted, she can act but not react. In our design, we exploit this latter condition. We compare two treatments of the so-called Poverty Game (Hammond, 1975) and examine whether and to what extent reciprocity induces cooperative gift giving. In both treatments, gift giving is individually costly, but collectively ecient. In addition, both treatments have a sequential move structure. First, player 1 decides on his gift to player 2, then player 2 decides on her gift to player 1 (priority in time). The treatments only dier in the information provided to player 2. In one treatment, player 2 is informed about the gift by player 1, in the other (control) treatment player 2 is not informed about the gift of player 1 when she decides about her gift to player 1. Only in the ®rst treatment there is priority in information. If reciprocity is to make a dierence, this dierence should show up in a comparison of the two information treatments. Notice, however, that reciprocating the anticipated gift of the other player is also possible in the (control) treatment without priority in time. To allow for a sharper view on the (relative) importance of such`anticipating reciprocity', we also ask the subjects in the experiment to give their expectations about the gift of the other player.
A second contribution of this paper concerns the eect of the matching structure on the occurrence of cooperation. In a previous paper (Van der Heijden et al., forthcoming) we investigated gift exchange with an``overlapping'' matching structure. There we had a series of experiments in which there was a succession of players, whereby each player decided on a gift to the preceding player. Player t decided on the gift to player t A 1, player t + 1 decided on the gift to player t, player t + 2 decided on the gift to player t + 1, and so on. Gift giving was again induced to be collectively ecient, but individually costly. Even in this so-called Pension Game (Hammond, 1975) , reciprocity may induce gift giving. In this case reciprocity is not`bilateral' but multilateral':``I keep agreements only with those who keep agreements with others'' (Sugden, 1986, p. 164) . If player t + 1 conditions his transfer on the gift by player t to player t A 1, player t + 2 conditions her transfer on the gift by player t + 1 and so on, then cooperative gift giving might be sustainable. 2 The experimental data of our overlapping matching experiments displayed two clear results. Firstly, there were hardly any signs of reciprocity, in the sense that the level of the gift by player t + 1 to player t was almost uncorrelated to the gift by player t to player t A 1. Secondly, positive gifts did 2 Overlapping matching structures have received widespread attention in the theoretical literature. In comparison to (repeated) bilateral matches, a sequence of overlapping matches poses special problems for cooperation. Applications include the sustainability of inter-generational transfers (e.g., Sjoblom, 1985) , and cooperation in in®nitely lived organizations with ®nitely lived agents (e.g., Cre Âmer, 1986). nonetheless occur. In fact, the average level of gifts was about halfway between the collectively ecient level and the individually rational level.
The present paper compares the results of the experiments with bilateral matches and those with overlapping matches. The potential for cooperation and reciprocity is quite dierent for the two matching structures. First, reciprocity in a bilateral match is more direct. Player 2 rewards or punishes player 1 in response to how player 2 herself was treated by player 1. With overlapping matches, however, player 2 rewards or punishes player 1 in response to how someone else was treated by player 1. Therefore, one would expect the force of reciprocity to be stronger in a bilateral relationship. Second, in a one-shot bilateral match an opportunistic second mover has a dominant strategy to make no return gift. In an (in®nite) overlapping sequence, on the other hand, no player has a dominant strategy to make no gift. There is always a next player who might reciprocate, and thus each player in the sequence has to take into account the next player's reaction.
3 Consequently, gifts might be larger due to this absence of dominant strategies. This feature of overlapping generations of players is well recognized in the theoretical literature (e.g., Smith, 1992), but has never been put to an experimental test. In sum, potentially two opposite forces are at work in a comparison between bilateral and overlapping matches, which in our view makes this comparison non-trivial and interesting.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the hypotheses and the experimental procedure of the bilateral gift giving experiment. Section 3 discusses the results. Section 4 discusses the eect of the matching structure: we compare gift giving with bilateral and overlapping matches. Section 5 presents a concluding discussion.
Hypotheses and procedure
A simple two-period Poverty Game forms the basis for the experiment. The crucial feature of the game is that gift giving is individually costly, but mutual gift giving is ecient. There are two players, player 1 and player 2. Each player is``rich'' in one period and``poor'' in the other period. In the ®rst period, player 1 is rich and player 2 is poor. Player 1 decides about his gift T 1 to player 2. In the second period the roles are reversed; player 2 is rich, player 1 is poor, and player 2 decides about her (return) gift T 2 to player 1. In the period a player is rich he has an endowment of 9, and in the period a player is poor he has an endowment of 1. Endowments and gifts together determine players'``consumption'' levels in the two periods. If player P i gives a gift of T i when he is rich, then his``consumption'' in that period is 9 A T i . If player i receives a gift of T j when he is poor, then player i's consumption in that period is 1 + T j . The payos to player i are de®ned as the product of the consumption levels in the two periods,
Two information treatments are employed in the Poverty Game experiment. In treatment I (Information), player 2 is informed about player 1's gift T 1 in the ®rst period, when he decides about his gift T 2 in the second period. In treatment N (No information), player 2 is not informed about T 1 when she decides about her gift T 2 . Formally, in treatment N, both players choose a strategy T i from the set f0Y 1Y F F F Y 7g (we only allow natural numbers, and no more then 7 can be given away). In treatment I, player 1 chooses a strategy T 1 in f0Y 1Y F F F Y 7g and player 2's strategy is a mapping s 2 : f0Y 1Y F F F Y 7g 3 f0Y 1Y F F F Y 7g, which speci®es her action T 2 as a function of player 1's action T 1 .
The pay-o function implies that each player would like to smooth consumption over the two periods. The only way to achieve this is to exchange gifts: to give when rich and to receive when poor. However, though collectively ecient, gifts are individually costly. Without any enforcement mechanisms, each player would be tempted to set T i 0. Furthermore, the information condition does not aect this game-theoretical prediction. In treatment N, the players actually play a game with simultaneous moves. No player can react to the gift of the other player. Therefore, in this treatment both players have a dominant strategy to play T i 0. In treatment I, player 2 still has a dominant strategy to give nothing. Player 1 does not have a dominant strategy as he has to take account of the reaction s 2 by player 2. However, player 1 should realize that player 2 will not play a strictly dominated strategy, which should lead him to the insight that player 2 will play s 2 (T 1 ) 0 irrespective of T 1 . Player 1 should thus also play T 1 0. So, gamesmanship predicts no gift giving in either treatment, though the argument needed for this prediction is somewhat stronger in treatment I (iterated elimination of dominated strategies) than in treatment N (elimination of dominated strategies). We formulate this prediction as Hypothesis 0 (Strict gamesmanship). There are no gifts (T i 0, i 1,2) in either treatment I or treatment N.
The gamesmen forego considerable pay-o opportunities. Each player earns only 9. If, for example, a binding agreement were possible then gifts would be optimally set at T i T j 4. This would give perfect consumption smoothing and almost triple the payos to 25. Hence, there are signi®cant incentives to arrive at some form of implicit cooperation.
Several recent experimental studies (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Bolle and Ockenfels, 1990; Fehr et al., 1993; Gu È th et al., 1993; Morris et al., 1995) suggest that reciprocity allows gains from cooperation to be realized. These experiments employ a sequential move structure, which allows the second mover to reward or punish the ®rst mover. These studies observe a degree of cooperation and eciency that is at odds with the hypothesis of strict gamesmanship. In addition, the data reveal signs of reciprocity, that is, a positive relation between action and reaction (though it must be admitted that the evidence is sometimes weak here). Berg et al. (1995) , for instance, study a two-stage investment game. In stage one, a player has to split $10 between a second player and herself. In the second stage, the amount given to the second player is tripled by the experimenter, and the second player has to decide how much of the total amount he wants to return to the ®rst player. In contrast with game-theoretic predictions, the authors found that 92% of the ®rst players transferred money and that 85% of the second players who received money actually returned some money. Berg et al. (1995) de®ne a reciprocal second player as one who gives back enough money to make player one better-o than in case player one had kept all the money herself. According to this de®nition, they can classify 46% of the second players who received money as reciprocal.
The present inquiry can partly be seen as an attempt to investigate the robustness of these ®ndings. Hence, we formulate:
Hypothesis 1 (reciprocity). (a) Gifts are positive in treatment I and larger than in treatment N.
(b) In treatment I the gift by the second player (T 2 ) is positively (cor)related to the gift by the ®rst player (T 1 ).
Part (b) of the hypothesis can be based on a`weak', as well as a`strong' form of reciprocity. A weak form of reciprocity, in line with the de®nition by Berg et al. (1995) , could work out as follows. For any value of 1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g, player 2 should at least give T 2 1 to make player 1 earn more than the payo of 9 which she can minimally earn by choosing T 1 0. For example, if player 1 chooses T 1 4 and player 2 responds with T 2 1, then player earns 10 (>9). Hence, if player 2 is weakly reciprocal then he should give T 2 > 0 whenever player 1 chooses 1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g. 4 If the players adhere to this weak form of reciprocity, we may perhaps only expect moderate transfer levels. Nevertheless, even transfers of T 1 T 2 1 would allow both players to earn 16 points, which is a considerable improvement over the payo of 9 which they would earn with zero gifts.
A stronger form of reciprocity would be one in which the gift by player 2 is monotonically increasing in the gift by player 1. 5 In particular, if player 1 believes that`what you give is what you can expect to get' then the collectively optimal level of gift exchange might be achieved. It is easily veri®ed that the payo in Eq. (1), subject to T j T i , is maximized by T i 4.
Before we spell out our experimental procedures, it is useful to note some dierences with the above-mentioned studies. First, our game has a fully symmetric setup in the sense that pay-o functions and action sets in the game are the same for both players (contrary to, e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Gu È th et al., 1993) . Therefore, with a reciprocal outcome (T i T j ) both players will have the same payo. We expect this feature to be conducive for reciprocity since it cannot interfere with concerns for income equality or equity.
Second, the Poverty Game is very simple. In our game it should be fairly obvious to the player how to reciprocate. For example, the reciprocity norm cannot be strengthened or weakened by competitive pressures like in the market experiments of Fehr et al. (1993) .
Third, subjects play the game repeatedly (contrary to, e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Bolle and Ockenfels, 1990) . This allows subjects to learn, and perhaps to learn to reciprocate. Of course, this also opens the possibility of reputation formation as a mechanism to support gift exchange, but the development of gifts over time will give us a hint at the relative importance of repeated-game considerations. Furthermore, after each round the players are rematched randomly and anonymously. Fourth, our subjects are paid in cash and paid according to their achievements in the experiments (contrary to Morris et al., 1995) . Hence, the incentive to arrive at a cooperative outcome, as well as the danger of being exploited are`real' and not just hypothetical. Moreover, we do not employ the`strategy method' as Bolle and Ockenfels (1990) do. In their experiment, subjects are asked to submit a complete action plan: How will you act if your opponent chooses to cooperate and how will you act if your opponent chooses not to cooperate. Since it is often observed that subjects make dierent choices in a state of certainty than in a state of uncertainty (violating the so-called sure thing principle, see, e.g., Sha®r and Tversky, 1992) , we chose to observe just subjects' choices rather than having them predict their choices in several states.
Finally, like Bolle and Ockenfels (1990) , we employ an experimental control treatment (N) which precludes reciprocity, but gives the same incentives to arrive at some form of cooperation. Especially this latter feature is important. The mere fact that there is more cooperation than predicted by game theory is not a sucient indicator for reciprocity. It is the control treatment that enables a sharper view on the extent to which reciprocity is responsible for any positive gift exchange and not, for instance, (pure or impure) altruism.
Note that Hypothesis 1 concentrates on reciprocity by player 2 based on the observed gift by player 1. As was discussed above, some authors allow reciprocity also to be based on expected gifts by the other player. This latter type of reciprocity can also be applied by the players in treatment N. We expect this type of reciprocity to have weaker force than one based on observed gifts. Therefore, we expect gifts to be higher in treatment I than in treatment N. Nevertheless, in the analysis we will investigate also whether there are signs for this form of reciprocity based on anticipated gifts.
Procedure
Ten experimental sessions based on the Poverty Game described above were run in March 1995, ®ve with each of the two information treatments I and N (and 11 with an overlapping matching structure in January 1995, see below). In each session eight subjects participated. Students from Tilburg University were recruited as subjects. An announcement in the University Bulletin solicited participants for a 1 h decision-making experiment, which would earn them money. No subject had previously participated in any related experiment, and no subject participated more than once.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated behind computer terminals, which were separated by partitions. Instructions (see Appendix) were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. After that, subjects were given several minutes to study the instructions more carefully and ask questions (few questions were asked).
Of course, in the experiments we did not use expressions like``consumption'', rich and poor. In the period a player is rich, he is called Decider, when poor a player is called Receiver. The gifts T i and T j were referred to as`t ransfer from you to the Receiver when you are the Decider'', and``transfer to you from the Decider when you are the Receiver''.
6 Consumption levels C iD and C iR were referred to as``®nal amounts''. Earnings in each round (U i ) were denoted in points and calculated according to Eq. (1). Subjects were also provided with a table, which gave U i as a function of T i and T j . Subjects knew that points would be transferred to money earnings at a rate of 1 point 5 cents. In addition, they earned a ®xed show-up fee of 5 guilders.
7
After one practice round, subjects played 15 repetitions of the bilateral gift giving game. In each round, subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned to one of four couples, and also randomly assigned to be the Decider in either the ®rst or the second period. For each couple, the ®rst Decider chose a transfer (T 1 ) to the ®rst Receiver. Then the two switched roles, and the second Decider chose a transfer (T 2 ) to the second Receiver. The only dierence between the two information treatments was that in treatment I the second Decider was informed about the transfer T 1 by the ®rst Decider before she had to decide about T 2 , whereas in treatment N the second Decider was not informed about T 1 when deciding on T 2 . At the end of a round in both treatments, subjects were informed about their own payos in that round. Hence, at that moment all subjects knew the size of the transfer given to them.
At the end of round 15, the points earned were accumulated and transferred into money earnings. Then an anonymous questionnaire asked for some background information (gender, age, major, motivation). Finally, subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash.
One ®nal remark has to be made with respect to the procedure. Both ®rst and second Deciders in treatment N and ®rst Deciders in treatment I were 6 The terms`gift' and`transfer' are taken as synonyms and used interchangeably here. In the experiment we used the term transfer (`overdracht' in Dutch) because it is more neutral than gift, which may have a somewhat positive connotation.
7 At the time of the experiments, one Dutch Guilder exchanged for about 0.65 US Dollars.
asked to type their expectation regarding the transfer f0Y 1Y F F F Y 7g to be received in the next period. Although we will make some use of these stated expectations, it is important to realize that the subjects were not paid to make (accurate) predictions.
Results
This section discusses the experimental results of the Poverty Game experiment. Table 1 presents the average transfer, averaged over the 15 rounds and the ®ve sessions, made by the ®rst player (T 1 ) and the second player (T 2 ) for treatments N and I. 8 The ®nal row and column show whether the transfers dier across the two players and across the two treatments, respectively. For that purpose we employ non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon and Mann±Whitney tests, respectively) and use the ten session averages as units of observation (because of the dependency of observations within each session). Small p-values indicate that the transfers dier signi®cantly.
Additional information can be obtained from the development of the gifts over the 15 rounds of play. For each round, Figs. 1 and 2 present the average transfers of the ®rst and second Decider (T 1 and T 2 ) in treatment N and treatment I, respectively. Recall that each treatment consisted of ®ve sessions with eight subjects, who formed four dierent pairs in each round. Each data point in the ®gures thus represents an average of 20 transfer decisions.
The ®gures and the table allow us to make ®ve main observations. First, contrary to hypothesis 0 (strict gamesmanship) we observe positive gift levels. The average gift level (averaged over all ten sessions) is 1.21. Although this level is at only 30% of the ecient gift level of 4, subjects are able to capture a major part of the possible gains from trade. Without gifts (T 1 T 2 0) they would earn 9 points; with ecient gift exchange (T 1 T 2 4) they would earn 25 points. Averaged over the two treatments, subjects' earnings are 17.38. Hence, on average, 52% ((17.38 A 9)/(25 A 9)´100) of the possible ef®ciency gains from gift exchange are actually realized. Although a strict comparison is hazardous, this by and large conforms to the eciency gains realized in Berg et al. (1995) and Fehr et al. (1993) . For example, in Berg et al. (1995) the average gift by the ®rst mover is $5.14 implying an eciency gain of 51% of the maximal possible gain. Second, in relation to the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, we observe that the average levels of gifts are higher in treatment I than in treatment N. This dierence rests entirely on the average transfer of the ®rst player (T 1 ), which is signi®cantly larger for treatment I than for treatment N. The average transfer of the second player (T 2 ) does not dier signi®cantly across the two treatments. Nevertheless, the average gift 1 2 (T 1 + T 2 ) is 1.01 for treatment N and at 1.41 about 40% higher in treatment I (this dierence is signi®cant at p 0.08 with a two-tailed Mann±Whitney test). As a consequence, the average payo in treatment I is somewhat higher (18.75) than in treatment N (16.02). This outcome contrasts with Hypothesis 0 (gamesmanship), which predicted no dierence in the level of transfers between the two treatments. The outcome is in line with part (a) of Hypothesis 1 (reciprocity) which predicted larger gifts in treatment I than in treatment N. Priority in information does increase the average level of gifts. Yet, the dierence, though signi®cant, is not overwhelming.
Third, the average levels of T 1 and T 2 are almost identical for treatment N. In treatment N the players take symmetrically strategic positions. Although the players move sequentially, neither player is informed about the move of the other player. In game-theoretical terms, the normal form of the game does not depend on who moves ®rst. Hence, in eect the game is identical to one with simultaneous moves, and the subjects can be seen to act accordingly. 9 9 Interestingly, this result is in contrast with recent experiments that found a clear eect of`priority in time' even without`priority in information' (Budescu et al., 1995; Morris et al., 1995; Rapoport, 1993, Sha®r and Tversky, 1992) . For example, Morris et al. report that subjects opt for cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma more often if they move ®rst than when they move second even without either player being informed about the move of the other player. This eect is sometimes attributed to`causal illusion'. Even though the ®rst player should know that his choice cannot in¯uence the choice of the second player, the fact that he moves ®rst activates a decision heuristic of acting so as to in¯uence the opponent. In the ®rst three rounds we ®nd some evidence for causal illusion, but this quickly disappears with experience.
Fourth, being the second mover appears to be the more favorable position in treatment I. Over the 15 rounds the average gift from the ®rst to the second Decider (T 1 ) is 2.10, whereas the average gift from the second to the ®rst Decider (T 2 ) in only 0.72. This dierence is signi®cant (p 0.04 with a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, with the ®ve session averages as observations), and does not show a tendency to become smaller or larger over the rounds. So, although the average level of gifts 1 2 (T 1 + T 2 ) is larger in treatment I, it is mainly player 2 who gains from this. On average the gift returned (T 2 ) is a mere 35% of the gift received (T 1 ). As a consequence, the average payo is 11.85 for player 1 and 25.65 for player 2.
Finally, in treatment N the gift levels display a clear tendency to move toward zero as the experiment proceeds. Transfers start at a level of about 1.6, then quickly drop to about 1, staying there till about round 12, and drop to about 0.2 in the ®nal round. Towards the end of the experiment, the subjects are able to capture only a very small portion of the potential gain from cooperation. At least this suggests that altruism (pure or impure) is not a particularly strong concern to the subjects. Also in treatment I the transfers have a tendency to decline over time, but here the eect is somewhat less pronounced. The dierence between ®rst and last round transfers is about 0.7 for both T 1 and T 2 .
To sum up, the average picture looks as follows. The data show that the possibility of monitoring and reciprocating previous gifts plays a facilitating role for the occurrence of gifts. Average gifts are larger in treatment I than in treatment N. However, the bene®ts mainly accrue to the player moving second. On average the gift returned is much smaller than the gift received. It seems that the player moving ®rst places considerable trust in reciprocity. His gift is much larger than the gifts observed in treatment N. The player moving second though, does not seem to reciprocate these gifts.
A closer examination of Hypothesis 1(b) corroborates this picture. Remember that we made a distinction between a`strong' and a`weak' form of reciprocity. A strong form of reciprocity would require a systematic positive relationship between T 1 and T 2 in treatment I. No such relation is visible in the data, however. The Pearson correlation coecient between T 1 and T 2 over all the 300 paired observations (5 session´15 rounds´4 matches) is only 0.006 and it is not signi®cantly dierent from zero (Table 6 in Appendix A gives a frequency table of all paired observations of T 1 and T 2 ). Furthermore, the correlation coecient declines over the rounds. In fact, it is even (non-signi®cantly) negative in the ®nal rounds.
A graphical representation of the relationship between T 2 and T 1 in treatment I gives the same picture. Fig. 3 depicts the``average reaction function'' of players 2, that is, the average level of the gift returned (T 2 ) as a function of the gift received (T 1 ). As gift levels of 1 P f5Y 6Y 7g are rare, we pool the response to these gifts with those to a gift of T 1 4. Furthermore, the ®gure displays the average reaction function separately for rounds 1±5, rounds 6± 10, and rounds 11±15.
The ®gure shows few signs of reciprocity. In the earlier rounds 1±5, we observe that the average value of T 2 in response to values of 1 P f3Y F F F Y 7g is somewhat larger than in response to values of 1 P f0Y 1Y 2g. The dierence is not very pronounced (about 0.8) and it is not signi®cantly dierent from zero. Furthermore, the reaction function in the middle rounds (6±10) and the later rounds (11±15) is almost¯at. On average, the gift returned is almost independent of the gift received. No systematic and signi®cant relationship between gifts received and gifts returned is observed, as a strong form of reciprocity would require. These results are in line with the results of Berg et al. (1995) (in their no-history treatment), and the replication by Ortmann et al. (1996) .
How about signs for a weaker version of reciprocity, more in line with the de®nition in Berg et al. (1995) p. 126? This would require that, for any value of 1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g, player 2 makes player 1 at least as well-o as when player 1 had played T 1 0. By playing T 1 0 player 1 ensures herself of a minimum payo of 9. It appears that in 68.7% of the cases in which the ®rst player plays 1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g, the ®rst player actually earns less than 9. Hence, in 31.3% of the cases the second player responds to 1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g with T 2 > 0. This compares somewhat unfavorably to the 46% reciprocal plays in Berg et al. (1995) . 10 The average pay-o to player 1 when playing 1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g is 10.54 which is more than the minimum pay-o of 9 which player 1 can get by playing T 1 0. However, the average pay-o to player 1 of playing T 1 0 is 15.73. Given the average reaction of the second player to the gift of the ®rst player, it would be in player 1's self-interest to give a transfer of zero. Moreover, in treatment N the percentage of players 1 who earn more than 9 when playing 1 P f1Y F F F 4g is 39%, which is even higher than in treatment I. In treatment N, by construction, reciprocity cannot be the reason for this outcome. This in turn makes it doubtful that (weak) reciprocity is a main force in treatment I.
Hence, we ®nd no signs for`strong' reciprocity by player 2 in treatment I, and some signs for`weak' reciprocity (though fewer than in Berg et al., 1995) . 11, 12 At the same time, we ®nd that the average level of gifts by player 1 is signi®cantly higher in treatment I than in treatment N. This could suggest that players 1 in treatment I at least place considerable trust in reciprocal gift giving by players 2. The data on expectations lend only limited support for such trust, however. For example, on average players 1 in treatment I expects a return gift of e 2 1X46 when they play T 1 0 and they expect e 2 1X87 when they play 1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g; a positive but very moderate eect. A similar 10 It does, however, compare favorably to the mere 15% of reciprocal players 2 found by Ortmann et al. (1996) in their replication of Berg et al. (1995) . 11 The dierence between the two treatments cannot be explained by reciprocity based on expected gifts by the other player (rather than observed gifts by the other player). If players feel an obligation to reciprocate the expected gift by the other player, then this should apply to the (®rst) players in both treatments. However, the average expected gift by the ®rst player in treatment I (1.79) is not signi®cantly dierent from the average expected gift in treatment N (1.57) and cannot explain the large dierence of T 1 in treatment I (2.10) and treatment N (0.72).
12 Another way in which reciprocity could manifest itself in both treatments, is through a positive (cor)relation between the gift given in a particular round and the gift received in the previous round. After all, a subject has a positive probability of meeting the same subject in the next round(s), and might feel obliged to reciprocate earlier gifts (even though a player cannot know to whom he is actually matched in any round). For this form of reciprocity across rounds we ®nd limited support. For example, in both treatments the average gift in round t is about 0.4 larger if in round t A 1 a gift tÀ1 P f1Y F F F Y 4g was received rather than a gift of tÀ1 0.
®nding is reported in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (1996) , who elicit (and reward) beliefs in a game similar to Berg et al. (1995) . In their study only 14 out of the 31 players who give away money expect to be rewarded by player 2 (and only 11 out of 31 actually get rewarded by player 2).
Furthermore, the average Pearson correlation coecient between the gift provided (T 1 ) and the expected return gift ( e 2 ) is signi®cantly positive in treatment I (r 0.34, p`0.01).
13 This positive correlation, however, rests entirely on the initial rounds of the experiment. It is as high as r 0.62 in rounds 1±5, but drops to r 0.08 in rounds 11±15. Hence, in the early rounds there seems to be signi®cant trust in reciprocity, but this trust disappears with repetition.
In view of these results it is interesting, and perhaps surprising, that the decline of the ®rst gift (T 1 ) over the rounds is not more pronounced in treatment I. Though the subjects seem to have become well aware of the fact that gifts are not being reciprocated, it is as if they nevertheless keep trying. This remarkable result is reminiscent to the one found in Forsythe et al. (1995) ; see also Fehr et al. (1995) . Forsythe et al. study an experimental market in which a seller is endowed with an asset, the quality of which is private information to the seller. Sellers can send a cheap talk message to buyers about the quality of the asset. The results reveal that sellers are quite willing to lie about the quality. In fact, the messages contain almost no information. More striking, however, is that buyers continue to place considerable trust in the messages of sellers. Consequently, buyers buy at too high prices and sellers gain at the expense of the buyers. This result explains the title of their paper:``Half a sucker is born every minute''.
It should be noted that in our experiment (as in Forsythe et al., 1995) , the subjects switch roles between rounds. The same subject who is the``exploitee'' in round t, may be the``exploiter'' in round s. The net eect of being exploitee in round t and exploiter in round s is positive compared with the outcomes in treatment N where the average gifts are lower: the average payos in treatment I (18.75) are somewhat higher than in treatment N (16.02). One might conjecture that this fact could explain the relatively slow decline of the level of T 1 over the rounds in treatment I. Subjects in the role of player 1 do not mind to be exploited by player 2, since they have a good change to be in the role of player 2 in the next round(s). 13 In Treatment N the average correlation coecient between gift T i and expected return gift e j is much lower at 0.15. We will come back to this in the discussion of Section 4.
To test this conjecture, we conducted ®ve follow-up sessions with treatment I, in which the subjects did not switch roles. A subject was either the ®rst or the second Decider in each of the 15 rounds. It turned out that the pattern and level of gifts in this treatment were almost identical to those in the treatment with random switching of roles. The average transfer of the ®rst Decider was 2.14 and the average gift of the second Decider was 0.99. As a result the subjects playing the ®rst Decider earned a lot less (13.06) than the subjects playing the second Decider (24.59). Thus, these additional sessions give no support for the hypothesis of`alternating exploitation', and corroborate our conclusion that the (moderate) trust that the ®rst player seems to put in the second player's obligation to reciprocate is too a large degree exploited by the second player.
14 In summary then, we appear to be in the rather awkward position to reject both Hypothesis 0 (gamesmanship) and Hypothesis 1 (reciprocity). On the one hand, the possibility of monitoring a received gift and reciprocating with a return gift appears to have a signi®cant (though moderate) positive eect on gift exchange, which is contrary to Hypothesis 0 but in line with Hypothesis 1(a). On the other hand, and contrary to Hypothesis 1(b), this positive eect is not mainly due to gifts being actually reciprocated. In other words, there seems to be (some) trust but hardly any reciprocity.
Bilateral versus overlapping gift giving
This section compares the results of the Poverty Game (i.e., bilateral gift giving), described in the previous section, with the results of our earlier Pension Game (i.e., overlapping gift giving, see Van der Heijden et al., forthcoming) . A prime motive for studying the latter games, is the theoretical attention for overlapping matching structures, on the one hand, and the lack of empirical insight into their eect, on the other hand (Lucas, 1986) . Though over-14 One might wonder whether there are large individual dierences between the subjects, obscuring the aggregate picture. Perhaps some act as gamesmen, while others act reciprocally. Clearly, classifying the dierent subjects is a tedious exercise. Nevertheless, some 20 out of 80 subjects could be typi®ed as strict gamesmen (12 in treatment N and 8 in treatment I); they choose a gift of 0 in at least 13 of the 15 rounds. On the other hand, 11 subjects (out of 40) in treatment I could be classi®ed as strong reciprocators. In their role as second deciders in treatment I the correlation coecient between gift received and gift returned was at least 0.50. However, according to this de®nition we also found 6 strong reciprocators in treatment N, which suggests that such occasionally high correlations may be a`statistical coincidence'. lapping matching structures are deemed important in many areas (see, e.g., Cre Âmer, 1986; Sandler, 1982) , they ®gure most prominently in the literature on inter-generational transfers. An issue that has received particular attention is the credibility problem of transfer schemes and pensions (Hammond, 1975; Kotliko et al., 1988; Sjoblom, 1985) . Even if a transfer scheme, or any cooperative arrangement, is collectively optimal ex ante, its establishment may be hindered by suboptimality ex post. There is no guarantee that today's decisions will not be overturned tomorrow. You may take a cooperative attitude toward others today, but which mechanism will ensure you that others will take a cooperative attitude toward you tomorrow?
The question of cooperation with overlapping matches is, of course, closely related to the question of cooperation in bilateral relationships. Under both matching structures, cooperation seems to require a systematic relationship between your decision now and the decision of others later. It has been argued that also in real life, reciprocity is a prerequisite for the political and public support of particular social security and pension plans (e.g., Waller, 1989) . In this respect it is interesting to note that Hammond (1975) describes the Poverty Game as one in which the players in turn are rich and poor, and the Pension Game as one in which the players are ®rst``young'' and theǹ`o ld''. In other words, the Poverty Game studies the support for unemployment or disability insurance schemes, whereas the Pension Game addresses the support for pay-as-you-go pension schemes. Hence, if it is true that also in reality the popular support for particular schemes depends on the presence of reciprocity, then it is interesting to study this support in the two dierent matching schemes experimentally. There are at least two features which make such a comparison non-trivial.
On the one hand, relationships in the Poverty Game are more direct than relationships in the Pension Game, which oers a better chance for reciprocity to be important. That is, it is more likely that subjects reward or punish in response to how they themselves have been treated than in response to how someone else has been treated (see also Gu È th and van Damme, 1994) . A more direct relationship might thus lead to larger transfers in the bilateral setting.
On the other hand, in a (one-shot) bilateral game it is a dominant strategy for the second player to transfer nothing, while in an overlapping sequence no player has a dominant strategy to transfer nothing. There is always someone next, who might reward or punish you for how you treated the previous player. This absence of a dominant strategies in the overlapping game might thus lead to larger transfers.
Hence, (at least) two opposing forces could aect the transfer decisions in the two matching structures. A comparison of the experimental results can shed some light on the relative strengths of these forces.
Design of the pension game experiment
Eleven sessions of the experiment with an overlapping (OL) matching structure were run in January 1995. The procedure in the Pension Game experiment was similar to that in the Poverty Game experiment as much as possible (see Van der Heijden et al., forthcoming, for details), that is, subjects were recruited from the same pool, eight players participated in each session, and each session consisted of 15 rounds of play. Each round, the sequence of the eight players has been determined in a random way. Payos are again determined by Eq. (1), as the product of the two consumption levels (as Decider and as Receiver). The dierences between the two games are most easily explained with the following picture. The arrows show who gives to whom, and the numbers indicate the order in which the players act (are the Decider). In a sense, with the bilateral structure a round consists of four times two periods, whereas with the overlapping structure it consists of eight periods, in seven of which a transfer decision is made (see below).
Bilateral : P 1 ¢ P 2 P 3 ¢ P 4 P 5 ¢ P 6 P 7 ¢ P 8 Overlapping : P 1 2 P 2 2 P 3 2 P 4 2 P 5 2 P 6 2 P 7 2 P 8
The two dierences referred to above are evident from the picture. First, in the Poverty Game the relationship is more direct in the sense that you give to the same person who gives to you. We expect this feature to be conducive to reciprocity. Second, the Pension Game ties more players to each other. There is always someone next, who can reward or punish you for the way you have treated another player. In game-theoretical terms, no player has a dominant strategy to give nothing. This feature has been shown to make cooperation supportable (Nash) in an in®nite sequence of ®nitely interacting players (Hammond, 1975; Salant, 1991; Smith, 1992) .
In an experiment, of course, one cannot have an in®nite sequence of players. So, the last player in the overlapping experiment has a dominant strategy of giving nothing. The backwards induction unraveling argument would then again predict all transfers to be zero. However, in ®nitely repeated games experimental subjects are sometimes seen to (learn to) employ`trigger-like' strategies to support outcomes that are non-Nash in the stage game (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Camerer and Weigelt, 1988) .
Similarly, if such strategies are employed and anticipated in our game, they can lead to positive transfers even with a ®nite sequence of overlapping players. 15 Again, two information treatments were run in the Pension Game experiment, namely with and without information about the previous Decider's gift. In the ®ve sessions of the OL treatment without information (labeled OL-N) players were not informed about the transfers made by previous players in a round. In the six sessions of the OL treatment with information (labeled OL-I) players were informed about all transfers made by previous players in a round, before they made their own decision. For ease of reference, the bilateral treatments with and without information will now be denoted by BL-I and BL-N, respectively.
Results
Table 2 presents the transfer levels for the two matching structures and the two information treatments. The middle block presents the overall average transfer level by treatment (averaged over subjects, rounds, and sessions). The last column and the last row present the signi®cance levels for the dierence of the average transfer level across the information condition and the matching structure, respectively. 16 Figs. 4 and 5 show the development of the average transfer level by round in the treatments with and without information, respectively. One can make two main observations. First, the transfer levels in the OL experiment are higher than in the BL experiment. Table 2 shows that at the session level the dierence is signi®cant only for the No-information treatments (BL-N versus OL-N). Fig. 4 , however, shows that also in the Information treatments, the transfers in OL-I are higher than in BL-I in almost every round.
17 As a consequence, the average eciency gain in the OL treatments is 70.6% (of the maximum of 16 25 A 9), whereas it is 52% for the BL treatments. The OL structure is more conducive for transfers than the BL structure.
The second observation is that, contrary to the Poverty Game experiment, the information condition does not seem to have any impact on the average level of gifts in the Pension Game experiment. That is, it does not make any dierence whether or not players are informed about the decision of the previous players in the sequence. This ®nding would suggest that the monitoring possibility (allowing for reciprocity) does not play an important role in treatment OL-I.
In examining the eect of monitoring we make again a distinction between strong and weak reciprocity. A closer examination demonstrates that hardly any signs of strong reciprocity are detected in the data. Analogously to Fig. 3 , the link between the transfer of a player and the transfer of the previous player is only very weakly positive in treatment OL-I (see Van der Heijden et al., forthcoming, for more details). The average reaction functions do not exhibit a clear positive slope, neither in earlier rounds nor in the later rounds. Furthermore, although the Pearson correlation coecient between a transfer by player P t and the transfer made by the previous player in the round P tÀ1 is signi®cantly positive, the overall correlation coecient of 540 observations is rather small, 0.14. It moreover decreases across the rounds and is not signi®cantly dierent from zero anymore in rounds 11±15. Signs for strong reciprocity are thus fairly small in treatment OL-I and cannot explain why transfers are higher than in treatment BL-I.
Regarding weak reciprocity it turns out that in treatment OL-I in 68% of the cases in which a player chooses t P f1Y F F F Y 4g he earns a payo greater than 9 (which he could ensure himself of by playing T t 0), which is more than double the rate of weakly reciprocal plays in treatment BL-I. Whether this is in fact due to weak reciprocity by the next player is again doubtful in view of the results in treatment OL-N. Also in this (control) treatment, in which by construction reciprocity cannot play a role, 70% of the players who play t P f1Y F F F Y 4g earn a payo larger than 9.
The absence of dominant strategies in the Pension Game cannot be a strong force either. Note that the absence holds only for treatment OL-I and not for treatment OL-N. In treatment OL-N all players in the sequence have a dominant strategy to supply a transfer of zero. However, as we have seen, the transfers in treatments OL-N and OL-I are not signi®cantly dierent. Apparently, the absence of dominant strategies does not aect the level of the transfers in overlapping setting.
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Like in the previous section, the results put us again in a rather awkward position. We do ®nd a signi®cant eect of the matching structure, but the effect is not attributable to any of the two hypothesized features: the eect of reciprocity or the absence of dominated strategies. In the next section we put forward some possible, admittedly rather speculative explanations.
Discussion
One consequence of the OL structure is that in each round all players are connected to each other, either directly or indirectly. P 1 is aected by the action of P 2 , who is in turn aected by the action of P 3 who is in turn aected by P 4 , and so on. In the BL treatment the players interact in pairs and only two out of eight players are linked. Therefore, in the OL treatment the subjects actually play a repeated game; in each round they are in a game with the very same subjects. In the BL treatment, the subjects also play the game repeatedly, but the probability of being in a game with the very same subject from one round to the next is only 1 7 . It is possible that this feature induces repeated game considerations (reputation formation) in the OL game to a larger extent than in the BL treatments. There is some indication for this, but the evidence is not particularly strong. For example, the average decline in the transfer level from the ®rst ®ve rounds to the last ®ve rounds is 0.61 in the OL experiments and 0.45 in the BL experiments. The dierence between the two treatments is not statistically signi®cant, however. Furthermore, the dierence in the decline of the transfer levels mainly rests on the dierence between OL-I and BL-I, whereas the main dierence in the average transfer level is the one between OL-N and BL-N (see Table 2 ).
Since the development of the transfers over time cannot explain the dierence between the treatments, perhaps a closer examination of the reported expectations gives a hint at a possible explanation. Table 3 presents the average correlation coecient between a player's own gift and the gift a player expects to receive for the two matching structures and the two information treatments.
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It turns out that the correlation coecient is signi®cantly higher in treatment OL-N than in treatment BL-N. At the same time, these average correlation coecients for treatment OL-I and BL-I are much closer and not signi®cantly dierent. Furthermore, the dierence between OL-N and OL-I is not signi®cant, whereas the dierence between BL-N and BL-I is (marginally) signi®cant. Interestingly, this pattern of correlations across the four treatments coincides exactly with the pattern of average transfer levels (see Table 2 ).
The question then is: How should these dierences in expectations be interpreted and explained? In the information treatments (OL-I and BL-I), a positive correlation between a player's own gift and the expected gift could be interpreted as``trust in reciprocity'': when I give more, I expect to receive more. In the no-information treatments (OL-N and BL-N) such an interpretation makes no sense from a rational point of view. The next player is 19 Correlations are calculated for each session separately and then averaged. For the OL treatments we look at the correlation between T t and e t1 (t 2Y F F F Y 6). In the BL treatments we look at the correlation between T i and e j (for i ¹ j 1, 2), where for BL-I we can only use the correlation between T 1 and e 2 , since player 2 does not need to give an expectation since he is informed about T 1 . not informed about your transfer; hence he cannot reciprocate. An interpretation that makes sense, even in no-information treatments, is that subjects to some extent try to match the gift they expect to receive (cf. Liebrand et al., 1986; Rabin, 1993; Sugden, 1984) . Hence, the question then becomes: why would subjects try to match the expected gift in the OL experiments to a stronger extent than in the BL experiments? A speculative explanation is the following.
As we noted above, the eight players in the OL experiments are in one game in each of the 15 rounds, whereas the players in the BL experiments switch opponent in each round. Furthermore, in the OL experiments a chain of players is tied together, whereas in the BL experiments the players act in pairs and there is less`social structure'. It is possible that because of this feature the subjects in the Pension Game experiments consider themselves to be part of a group to a larger extent than the subjects in the Poverty Game experiments do. As social-identity theory suggests (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1986) , when subjects consider themselves to be members of a group, more or less sharing a common fate, they are more inclined to take account of the group-interest than when they consider themselves as single individuals. If subjects in the OL experiments are more group-oriented this could explain why they are more inclined to try and match the gift they expect to receive than are the subjects in BL experiments. In group dilemmas it is often observed that subjects' degree of cooperation is strongly correlated with the expected degree of cooperation of the other group members. For example, Oerman et al. (1996) ®nd that a subject's degree of cooperation is strongly correlated with her expectation of the degree of cooperation of other group members (see also Wit and Wilke, 1992) . Interestingly, Oerman (1996) also ®nds that this correlation between action and expectation is stronger when subjects interact with the same partners repeatedly (like in our OL experiments), than when they switch partners after each round (like in our BL experiments). Hence, if the OL experiments elicit a more group-oriented attitude than the BL experiments then this is much in line with the observed dierence in the correlation between gift expected and gift provided.
Furthermore, if the subjects' orientation in two matching structures diers, this could also explain why the impact of the information treatments works out dierently. Generally, in bilateral (bargaining) situations, the strategic positions of players are strongly dependent on the information they receive (cf. Gu È th and van Damme, 1994) . Also in the Poverty Game experiment, information turns out to have a signi®cant impact. If the second player is informed about the ®rst player's gift, this fact puts him in a more advantageous position. So, the monitoring possibility raises the average level of gifts. The trade-o between individual and group interest in a group dilemma, however, does not depend much on the information condition. In our Pension Game experiment the possibility of monitoring hardly aects the average level of gifts. 20 Even without information about previous players' gifts, subjects in an overlapping sequence still seem oriented toward voluntary gift giving.
Summary and conclusion
It is often argued that the reciprocity norm is one of the main vehicles that allow gains from cooperation to be realized, even in situations in which noncooperation seems the more attractive alternative in terms of private incentives.
In the present study we have examined the force of the reciprocity norm in supporting cooperative gift exchange in experiments in which gift giving was mutually bene®cial but individually costly. One innovation of the present study was to examine the extent to which reciprocity induces cooperation by comparing two information treatments in the Poverty Game. In both treatments, the subjects acted one after the other. In one treatment (I) the subject moving second was informed about the gift of the subject moving ®rst. In the other treatment (N), however, the subject moving second was not informed about the subject moving ®rst, and by design reciprocity was physically impossible because the second player could not react (although there is priority in time, there is no priority in information).
A second innovation was that we did not only study cooperative gift giving in bilateral relationships (Poverty Games) but also examined situations with an overlapping matching structure (Pension Games). In a bilateral match player 1 receives a gift from player 2 and player 2 receives a gift from player 1. In an overlapping match player 1 receives from player 2, who in turn receives from player 3, who in turn receives from player 4, and so on. 20 Also in Erev and Rapoport (1990) , the number of cooperative choices in a public-goods experiment does not depend on whether the players decide sequentially (with priority in time and information) or simultaneously. What is aected though, is the number of times the step-level public good is actually provided. The sequential move structure mainly acts as a coordination device, but does not aect the strategic positions of the players.
Overlapping matching structures pose special problems for cooperation, and have (only) received widespread theoretical attention.
Our analysis displayed the following main results. First, in line with the reciprocity hypothesis, and contrary to the hypothesis of strict gamesmanship, average gifts were (about 40%) higher in treatment I than in treatment N of the Poverty Game. The monitoring possibility (priority in information) increased the average level of gifts. This increase in average gifts mainly rested on the ®rst player of each match, however. The ®rst player seemed to place considerable trust in the second player's obligation to reciprocate gifts, but the second player basically decided to exploit this trust. Moreover, no systematic or signi®cant (cor)relation between the gift received and the gift returned was found. Very few signs for reciprocity (of either a weak or a strong form) were visible in the data.
Second, in the Pension Game experiment the possibility of monitoring the gifts of the previous players in the chain did not have any impact on the average level of gifts. And, again, no signi®cant or systematic (cor)relation between the present gift and the previous gift was found. Nevertheless, average gift levels were substantial and, moreover, higher than in the Poverty Game.
An admittedly speculative explanation for the latter result relates to social identity theory. In the Pension Game, all players in each round of the game are tied together, either directly or indirectly. In the Poverty Game, players interact in pairs, and there is less social structure. Perhaps these features elicit a more group-oriented behavior in the Pension Game than in the Poverty Game. This conjecture is in line with our ®nding that the correlation between subjects' own gift and expected gift is larger in the Pension Game than in the Poverty Game. Subjects appear to have a stronger inclination to match the gift they expect to receive in the former game. A more group-oriented attitude in the Pension Game is also in line with our ®nding that the information treatment ± which aects the strategic position of the players ± has a much smaller impact in the Pension Game than in the Poverty Game.
Irrespective of the validity of the latter explanation, we believe that our study at least warrants two recommendations. First, we found little force for reciprocity in the sense that`what you give is related to what the other gave'. We did ®nd some evidence, particularly in the Pension Game, for what you give is related to what you expect to get'. This also relates to a conditional obligation and Sugden (1984) calls it reciprocity. Although, of course, these two forms of reciprocity are related, they are not quite the same thing. One form of reciprocity may be possible in situations in which the other form is impossible. Furthermore, dierent situations may be conducive for a particular form of reciprocity. So, the issue of whether reciprocity exists as a social norm is rather complicated. As Dufwenberg and Gneezy (1996) remark:``The issue of when and in what sense reciprocity is important is apparently a delicate one, and more research seems necessary in order to disentangle the various aspects''. The situation becomes even more complicated as terms like cooperative egoism, fairness, tit-for-tat, kindness, reciprocal altruism, and anticipated reciprocity are sometimes used synonymously and interchangeably, but at other times are intended to convey more or less subtle dierences. As Kerr (1995) remarks``such terms often mean dierent things to dierent investigators and communication and comparison of ®nd-ings become dicult''.
Second, the vast majority of experimental inquiry focuses on bilateral interaction or interaction in ®xed groups. In many situations, however, people's interactions partly overlap. This holds for inter-generational relationships, but also for interaction within and between organizations and networks. Theoretically, such interactions have been shown to raise special questions for the possibilities of cooperation (for example, with respect to social contracts, transfer schemes, sustainability of the environment). Our results demonstrate that these questions are even more intricate than (game) theoretical analysis suggests, and that they are worthy of further experimental investigation. 
. Decisions and earnings
The experiment exists of 15 separate rounds. In every round, each of you will earn a certain amount of points. At the end of the experiment the points earned in the 15 rounds are added up for each participant separately. Every point earned is worth 5 cent (%$0.028) at the end of the experiment. In addition to this, all participants receive a ®xed extra amount of f 5. Your total earnings will thus be equal to f 5 plus the number of points earned times 5 cent. Now, we describe how the points earned in each round will be determined.
In each round you will be matched with another participant. Each round will consist of two periods. In every round you have in one period the role of Decider and in the other period the role of Receiver. The earnings of a participant in a round are determined by the ®nal amount of a participant in the period in which he or she is a Decider, and by the ®nal amount of the participant in the period in which he or she is a Receiver. We denote the ®nal amount when Receiver by E O and the ®nal amount when as Decider by E B . The earnings in points of a participant in a round are determined by the product of the ®nal amount when Receiver and the ®nal amount when Decider. The earnings of a participant in a round are thus equal to E B´EO points. Next, we describe how the ®nal amount when Decider E B and the ®-nal amount when Receiver E O are determined.
In each round the participants are ®rst randomly matched two by two. After that the computer determines for each couple who will be the Decider and who will be the Receiver in the ®rst period. In the second period the roles are reversed: the Decider in the ®rst period is thus the Receiver in the second period and the Receiver in the ®rst period is the Decider in the second period. The Receiver starts with an endowment of 1, whereas the Decider starts with an endowment of 9. The Decider has to decide which part of his or her endowment that he or she wants to transfer to the Receiver. This transfer, which we will denote by T, is 0 at the minimum, and 7 at the maximum. After the Decider has decided on the transfer T to the Receiver, the ®nal amount of the Receiver is E O 1 + T, and that of the Decider is E B 9 A T. After the Decider has decided on her or his transfer to the Receiver, the second period of the round will be started, in which the roles are reversed.
In the second period, the other participant of the couple, who is the Decider now, will have to make a decision. The determination of the ®nal amounts of the new Receiver and Decider in this period is similar to the previous period. The Receiver starts with an endowment of 1 and the Decider starts with an endowment of 9. The Decider decides again on the part of her or his endowment that will be transferred to the Receiver. This transfer T determines the ®nal amounts of both participants in the second period: E O 1 + T for the Receiver and E B 9 A T for the Decider.
As said, your earnings in a round are determined by the product of your ®nal amount E B in your role of Decider and the ®nal amount E O in your role of Receiver. Your amount E B depends on your transfer to the Receiver in the period you are Decider and your amount E O depends on the transfer from the Decider to you in the period you are Receiver. To facilitate the determination of your earnings, you may use the table below.
The table states your earnings in points in a round dependent on the transfer from you to the Receiver when you are Decider and the transfer to you by the Decider when you are Receiver. In this table the rows present the transfer from you as Decider to the Receiver and the columns present the transfer to you as Receiver from the Decider. When you ®rst look for the transfer from you in the row and then go to the right to the column stating the transfer to you, you can read your earnings in points, E B´EO , for the round. The earnings in money are determined by multiplying the amount stated in points by 5 cents.
When the two periods of a round are over, so when both participants have decided on a transfer, a new round will be started. After we have gone through the instructions, ®rst a practice round will be run. After the practice round, the ®fteen rounds will be run, which determine your earnings for this experiment.
In every round the computer, in a completely random manner, ®rst determines who will be matched to whom. Then the computer determines, again in a random manner, for each couple who will get the role of Receiver and Decider in the ®rst period. On the upper left part of the screen the Decider will see the number of the current round and the message``You are now Decider in the ®rst period''. Underneath the Decider will see the questioǹ`H ow much of your endowment do you transfer (0±7)?'' The Decider has to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with whom she or he has been matched in this round.
Next, the current Decider will be asked the question``How much do you expect to receive?''. Here, the Decider types an integer from 0 up to and including 7, dependent on her or his expectation about the transfer she or he expects to receive as Receiver in the next period. This expectation is used by us when analyzing the experiment, but your earnings will be unaected by it. Besides, the other participants are not informed about your expectations stated.
After all Deciders have made a decision, the ®rst period is over. In the second period the Receivers of the ®rst period are now the Deciders. Every new Decider will see on the screen that in this round he or she is Decider in the second period [and how much he or she has received in the previous period]. Underneath the question is asked``How much of your endowment do you transfer (0±7)?''. The Decider has to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with whom he has been matched in this round. When all Deciders of the second period have made a decision all participants will see how much they have received and what their earnings for the rounds are. These earnings are in points and are equal to the product of the ®nal amount when Decider and the ®nal amount when Receiver: E B´EO . After one has been informed about this, the round is over and a new round will be started.
In the new round, the computer again determines ®rst who will be matched with whom and next for each couple who will be the ®rst Decider. So, you will not know with whom you will be matched in a particular round and whether you will be the ®rst or the second Decider.
B.2.3. Summary
The experiment consists of 15 rounds, and every round consists of 2 periods. In each round the participants are randomly matched two by two by the computer. In each round every participant has in one period the role of Decider and in the other period the role of Receiver. When you are Decider your endowment is 9 and your ®nal amount depends on your transfer T to the Receiver: E B 9 A T. When you are Receiver your endowment is 1 and your ®nal amount depends on the transfer T by the Decider to you: E O 1 + T. Your earnings in points in a round are determined by the product of your ®nal amount when Decider and your ®nal amount when Receiver: E B´EO . [After the ®rst period of a round is over the new Deciders are informed about the transfer T which they have received in the ®rst period.] After both periods of a round have been ®nished, everybody is informed about the transfer T to him or her and his or her earnings in that round.
The matching of the participants and the order in which participants are Decider in the two periods of a round are determined by the computer in a completely random way time after time. You will never be able to know whether you will be the ®rst or the second Decider in a particular round, or with whom you are matched in a particular round.
B.3. Final remarks
After the last round, you will ®rst be requested to answer some questions to evaluate the experiment. This questionnaire is anonymous. We can link your answers to your seat number but not to your name. After that, you will be called by your seat number to receive your earnings privately and con®-dentially. Your earnings are your own business; you do not need to discuss with anyone. It is not allowed to talk to or communicate with other participants during the experiment in either way.
On your table you will ®nd an empty sheet, which you can use to take notes. Additionally, you will ®nd a sheet labelled``REMARKS''. On this sheet you can make remarks about the instructions or your decisions.
You get a couple of minutes to go through the instructions and to ask questions. When you want to ask something, please raise your hand. One of us will come to your table to speak to you.
After that we will start the practice round.
Are there any questions?
